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Supreme Court clarifies limitations period under Title VII - August 0August 02
On June 10, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Title VII plaintiff raising claims for discrete discriminatory/retaliatory acts must file a charge within the appropriate 180- or 300-day limitations period [1] but a charge alleging a hostile work environment will not be time-barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period. See National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, U.S., No. 00-1614 (2002) found at 2001 Term Opinions of the Court. The Courts decision was unanimous regarding discrete acts and split 5:4 on the hostile environment issue. Overall, the decision is a mixed blessing for employers.
The plaintiff in the case, Abner J. Morgan, filed a charge with the EEOC and California Department of Fair Employment and Housing alleging that, during the time he worked for Amtrak, he was consistently harassed and disciplined more harshly than other employees on account of his race. Some of the acts of which Morgan complained occurred outside of the 300-day limitations period and the district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak on this basis. In finding for the employer, the district court stated: because Morgan believed that he was being discriminated against at the time that all of these alleged acts occurred, it would not be unreasonable to expect that Morgan should have filed an EEOC charge on these facts before the limitations period on these claims ran. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that its precedent precluded such a notice limitation on the continuing violation doctrine.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court distinguished between claims arising from discrete discriminatory acts, and those arising from an alleged hostile work environment. With regard to claims based on discrete acts, the Court stated the following:
First, discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the 180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The existence of past acts and the employees prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.
Distinguishing hostile work environment claims, the Court went on to state:
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct. . . . The unlawful employment practice therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. . . . Such claims are based on the cumulative affect of individual acts.
In the Courts view, a discrete act constitutes one unlawful employment practice whereas a hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice (i.e. it is the repetition that matters). As examples of discrete acts, the Court listed termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire and noted that they are easy to identify.
What does this mean for employers in Maine? [2] Presumably, the MHRC will follow Morgan in applying its six-month limitations period. Regardless, in defending discrimination claims, employers should always check the complaint to be sure that the complained-of acts occurred within six months of the date the charge was filed. Employers should not rely on the MHRC to weed out untimely claims for them. Where a complaint alleges discrete acts, some of which occur outside of the six-month period, employers may argue that claims based on those acts are time barred. Complainants will, in turn, argue that those acts, even if time barred for purposes of liability, serve as background evidence in support of timely claims. In order to avoid problems with the limitations period, employees (at least those who seek legal counsel) may now be more inclined to file multiple claims and file such claims while still employed.
[1] Charges must be filed with EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. However, in states or localities where there is an antidiscrimination law and an agency authorized to grant or seek relief, a charge must be presented to that state or local agency. Furthermore, in such jurisdictions, charges may be filed with EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory act, or 30 days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated its processing of the charge, whichever is earlier.
[2] Prior to Morgan, the First Circuit had held as follows with respect to the continuing violation doctrine as applied to Title VII hostile work environment claims: Even where a plaintiff alleges a violation within the appropriate statute of limitations period, the continuing violation claim will fail if the plaintiff was or should have been aware that he was being unlawfully discriminated against while the earlier acts, now untimely, were taking place. See Provencher v. CVS, No. 97-1711 (1st Cir. 1998) at http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1711.01A citing Sabree, 921 F.2d at 401-02.
Please contact Matthew S. Raynes, mraynes@eatonpeabody.com, for further information.
This paper is provided as general information, and is not a substitute for legal or other professional advice.
On June 10, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Title VII plaintiff raising claims for discrete discriminatory/retaliatory acts must file a charge within the appropriate 180- or 300-day limitations period [1] but a charge alleging a hostile work environment will not be time-barred if all acts constituting the claim are part of the same unlawful practice and at least one act falls within the filing period. See National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, U.S., No. 00-1614 (2002) found at 2001 Term Opinions of the Court. The Courts decision was unanimous regarding discrete acts and split 5:4 on the hostile environment issue. Overall, the decision is a mixed blessing for employers.
The plaintiff in the case, Abner J. Morgan, filed a charge with the EEOC and California Department of Fair Employment and Housing alleging that, during the time he worked for Amtrak, he was consistently harassed and disciplined more harshly than other employees on account of his race. Some of the acts of which Morgan complained occurred outside of the 300-day limitations period and the district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak on this basis. In finding for the employer, the district court stated: because Morgan believed that he was being discriminated against at the time that all of these alleged acts occurred, it would not be unreasonable to expect that Morgan should have filed an EEOC charge on these facts before the limitations period on these claims ran. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that its precedent precluded such a notice limitation on the continuing violation doctrine.
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court distinguished between claims arising from discrete discriminatory acts, and those arising from an alleged hostile work environment. With regard to claims based on discrete acts, the Court stated the following:
First, discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the 180- or 300-day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The existence of past acts and the employees prior knowledge of their occurrence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about related discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.
Distinguishing hostile work environment claims, the Court went on to state:
Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct. . . . The unlawful employment practice therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. . . . Such claims are based on the cumulative affect of individual acts.
In the Courts view, a discrete act constitutes one unlawful employment practice whereas a hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice (i.e. it is the repetition that matters). As examples of discrete acts, the Court listed termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire and noted that they are easy to identify.
What does this mean for employers in Maine? [2] Presumably, the MHRC will follow Morgan in applying its six-month limitations period. Regardless, in defending discrimination claims, employers should always check the complaint to be sure that the complained-of acts occurred within six months of the date the charge was filed. Employers should not rely on the MHRC to weed out untimely claims for them. Where a complaint alleges discrete acts, some of which occur outside of the six-month period, employers may argue that claims based on those acts are time barred. Complainants will, in turn, argue that those acts, even if time barred for purposes of liability, serve as background evidence in support of timely claims. In order to avoid problems with the limitations period, employees (at least those who seek legal counsel) may now be more inclined to file multiple claims and file such claims while still employed.
[1] Charges must be filed with EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. However, in states or localities where there is an antidiscrimination law and an agency authorized to grant or seek relief, a charge must be presented to that state or local agency. Furthermore, in such jurisdictions, charges may be filed with EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory act, or 30 days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated its processing of the charge, whichever is earlier.
[2] Prior to Morgan, the First Circuit had held as follows with respect to the continuing violation doctrine as applied to Title VII hostile work environment claims: Even where a plaintiff alleges a violation within the appropriate statute of limitations period, the continuing violation claim will fail if the plaintiff was or should have been aware that he was being unlawfully discriminated against while the earlier acts, now untimely, were taking place. See Provencher v. CVS, No. 97-1711 (1st Cir. 1998) at http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=97-1711.01A citing Sabree, 921 F.2d at 401-02.
Please contact Matthew S. Raynes, mraynes@eatonpeabody.com, for further information.
This paper is provided as general information, and is not a substitute for legal or other professional advice.
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