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Supreme Court upholds EEOC's ADA rule regarding direct threat defense - 6.14 02
On June 10, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld an EEOC regulation providing that, under the ADA, an employee's disability may pose a direct threat [1] to his or her own health or safety in the workplace; a defense to liability under the Act. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, U.S., No. 00-1406 (2002) found at 2001 Term Opinions of the Court. While it had previously been clear under the ADA that the direct threat defense [2] was available where an employee's condition posed a threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace, a split had emerged in the circuits as to whether the defense was available where working with the condition posed a direct threat to the employee's own health or safety.
The plaintiff in the case, Mario Echazabal, worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron. Although he had applied for employment at Chevron itself, Chevron had extended an offer conditioned upon him passing the company's physical exam. Both times Echazabal applied, the exam revealed what was later diagnosed as Hepatitis C, which company doctors stated would be aggravated by exposure to toxins at the refinery.
In its decision, the Court reasoned that, although the statute clearly states that the direct threat defense applies where a disabled employee poses such a threat to the health or safety of others, this application is not exhaustive. Accordingly, the EEOC's extension of this standard to situations where an employee posed a direct threat to his or her own health or safety was reasonable. The Court noted that, in practice, the employer would be "asking for trouble" with OSHA if it allowed an individual to simply consent to the particular dangers the job would pose. The Court also rejected the argument that the EEOC regulation promoted the exact sort of paternalism towards the disabled which the ADA was designed to eliminate. The Court's decision is an increasingly rare instance where legal reasoning and common sense coalesce.
What does this mean for employers? In the First Circuit and beyond, it clears the way for employers to assert the direct threat defense where an employee, because of his or her condition, poses a direct threat to his or her own health or safety. However, employers should remember that the direct threat determination must be based upon a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. Also, where requested, the parties must first explore reasonable accommodations which may eliminate the direct threat. Even in light of Chevron, employers should carefully evaluate the situation before raising the issue of direct threat.
[1] Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a ``direct threat'' shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include:(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.
[2] The direct threat language provides more than a defense. In the First Circuit, where the essential functions of a plaintiffs job necessarily implicate the safety of others, employers may raise the direct threat issue in arguing that an individual who poses a direct threat to others is not a qualified individual under the ADA. See EEOC v. Amego, No. 96-837 (1st Cir. 1997) at EEOC v. Amego, Inc. If raised in this context, the plaintiff, not the employer, would bear the burden of proof
Please contact Matthew S. Raynes, mraynes@eatonpeabody.com, for further information.
This paper is provided as general information, and is not a substitute for legal or other professional advice.
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Supreme Court upholds EEOC's ADA rule regarding direct threat defense - 6.14 02
On June 10, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld an EEOC regulation providing that, under the ADA, an employee's disability may pose a direct threat [1] to his or her own health or safety in the workplace; a defense to liability under the Act. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, U.S., No. 00-1406 (2002) found at 2001 Term Opinions of the Court. While it had previously been clear under the ADA that the direct threat defense [2] was available where an employee's condition posed a threat to the health or safety of others in the workplace, a split had emerged in the circuits as to whether the defense was available where working with the condition posed a direct threat to the employee's own health or safety.
The plaintiff in the case, Mario Echazabal, worked for independent contractors at an oil refinery owned by Chevron. Although he had applied for employment at Chevron itself, Chevron had extended an offer conditioned upon him passing the company's physical exam. Both times Echazabal applied, the exam revealed what was later diagnosed as Hepatitis C, which company doctors stated would be aggravated by exposure to toxins at the refinery.
In its decision, the Court reasoned that, although the statute clearly states that the direct threat defense applies where a disabled employee poses such a threat to the health or safety of others, this application is not exhaustive. Accordingly, the EEOC's extension of this standard to situations where an employee posed a direct threat to his or her own health or safety was reasonable. The Court noted that, in practice, the employer would be "asking for trouble" with OSHA if it allowed an individual to simply consent to the particular dangers the job would pose. The Court also rejected the argument that the EEOC regulation promoted the exact sort of paternalism towards the disabled which the ADA was designed to eliminate. The Court's decision is an increasingly rare instance where legal reasoning and common sense coalesce.
What does this mean for employers? In the First Circuit and beyond, it clears the way for employers to assert the direct threat defense where an employee, because of his or her condition, poses a direct threat to his or her own health or safety. However, employers should remember that the direct threat determination must be based upon a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. Also, where requested, the parties must first explore reasonable accommodations which may eliminate the direct threat. Even in light of Chevron, employers should carefully evaluate the situation before raising the issue of direct threat.
[1] Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. The determination that an individual poses a ``direct threat'' shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to be considered include:(1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The imminence of the potential harm.
[2] The direct threat language provides more than a defense. In the First Circuit, where the essential functions of a plaintiffs job necessarily implicate the safety of others, employers may raise the direct threat issue in arguing that an individual who poses a direct threat to others is not a qualified individual under the ADA. See EEOC v. Amego, No. 96-837 (1st Cir. 1997) at EEOC v. Amego, Inc. If raised in this context, the plaintiff, not the employer, would bear the burden of proof
Please contact Matthew S. Raynes, mraynes@eatonpeabody.com, for further information.
This paper is provided as general information, and is not a substitute for legal or other professional advice.
<< Back to News